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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, the General Assembly ("GA") has
passed and the governor has signed some significant, but not ma-
jor, pieces of legislation regarding family law. The most signifi-
cant piece of legislation on the subject was passed in the 2011 leg-
islation session,' resulting from a decision by the Supreme Court
of Virginia that reversed twenty-five years of practice and deci-
sions of trial courts and the court of appeals concerning title clas-
sification and allocation of debts.2
Developments in case law have also been modest. Aside from a
brief panic in the wake of Gilliam v. McGrady,' most case law re-
fined the finer points of family law. Practitioners, however, will
be well-served to pay attention to the cases dealing with setting
aside marital agreements, rights of third parties in custody and
visitation, and the complex intricacies of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). In the past
few years, the court of appeals provided many opinions on these
particular topics.
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1. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 655, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
2. See 279 Va. 703, 708-10, 691 S.E.2d 797, 799-801 (2010).
3. 279 Va. 703, 691 S.E.2d 797.
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II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Case Law
1. Preserving Issues for Appeal
The court of appeals has strictly adhered to the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia, especially those dealing with preserv-
ing and presenting issues on appeal. Trial attorneys should al-
ways be wary to preserve their client's objections for review by
the appellate courts. Supreme Court of Virginia Rules 5A:18 and
5A:20 can be especially thorny for both veteran attorneys and lit-
igants proceeding pro se in domestic matters.' In the past three
years, the court of appeals' opinions show that these rules remain
as strong as ever, and noncompliance is almost assuredly fatal.'
Appealing de novo from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Court ("J&DR") is more "de novo" than "appellate." For
example, in Alexander v. Flowers, the court of appeals found error
by the circuit court for demanding the appealing party to produce
new or different new evidence at the de novo hearing than that
presented at the J&DR proceedings.'
4. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A, 5A:18 (2011) ("No ruling of the trial court ... will be con-
sidered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at
the time of the ruling. . A mere statement that the judgment or award is contrary to the
law and the evidence is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review."); VA. SUP.
CT. R. pt. 5A, 5A:20(e) (2011) (requiring the party to provide, for each assignment of error,
the standard of review and the legal argument, with citation to principals of law and au-
thority); see, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 52 Va. App. 663, 664, 666 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2008) (deem-
ing all of the wife's questions presented on appeal as waived when Rule 5A:20(e) was not
followed because no legal authority regarding the assignments of error was presented)
(quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520, 659 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008)).
5. See, e.g., McShane v. McShane, No. 0066-09-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 280, at *1-3
(June 23, 2009) (unpublished decision) (refusing to hear arguments on appeal of spousal
support ruling without specific written findings of fact to support the arguments, as re-
quired by Rule 5A:18); see also Coleman v. Hogan, No. 2927-08-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS
263, at *1-3 (June 16, 2009) (unpublished decision) (refusing to hear father's claims where
he did not adhere to Rule 5A:18 when he failed to object to the J&DR court's order of dis-
missal at the circuit court proceeding); Mosteller v. Brooks, No. 2889-07-4, 2008 Va. App.
LEXIS 565, at *2-3 (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished decision) (refusing to hear wife's claim of
perjury and fraud by husband's attorney because those arguments were not presented to
the trial court as required by Rule 5A:18). See generally VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A, R. 5A:18
(2011).
6. 51 Va. App. 404, 413-14, 658 S.E.2d 355, 359 (2008) (holding that this demand
denied the appealing party of her statutory right to a de novo appeal).
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2. Jurisdiction
Same-sex litigation in the court of appeals is rarely about sex
and more often about procedure. In Miller v. Jenkins, one woman
attempted three times to collaterally attack custody orders from
Vermont: once in the Supreme Court of Virginia, once in the
Court of Appeals of Virginia, and once in the Circuit Court for the
City of Winchester.'
Miller filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of
Winchester seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' Jenkins
demurred Miller's complaint, claiming that all issues raised by
Miller were previously addressed by both the supreme court and
the court of appeals.' The circuit court agreed and dismissed Mil-
ler's declaratory complaint with prejudice."o At the same time Mil-
ler was seeking declaratory relief, Jenkins filed a petition to reg-
ister the Vermont custody orders." Miller appealed the circuit
court's dismissal of her declaratory petition, and Jenkins argued
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction."
The court of appeals agreed with Jenkins that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction to hear Miller's declaratory complaint.'" The
court explained that relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act
cannot lie where other remedies are available. 4 Because the relief
Miller sought was to stop Jenkins from registering the Vermont
orders, and because Miller filed objections opposing Jenkins from
doing so, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear a de-
claratory action." The relief Miller sought was being litigated in
the proceeding filed by Jenkins-the two actions were essentially
the same."
Jurisdiction may also impact an award of attorney's fees on ap-
peal. For example, in Kotara v. Kotara, the court of appeals de-
7. 54 Va. App. 282, 285-86, 678 S.E.2d 268, 269 (2009).
8. Id. at 285, 678 S.E.2d at 269.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 285-86, 678 S.E.2d at 269.
11. Id. at 286, 678 S.E.2d at 269-70.
12. Id. at 286-87, 678 S.E.2d at 270.
13. Id. at 287, 678 S.E.2d at 270.
14. Id. at 289, 678 S.E.2d at 271.
15. Id. at 289-90, 678 S.E.2d at 271.
16. Id. at 289, 678 S.E.2d at 271.
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termined whether an award of attorney's fees against appellant,
the husband, was proper where the court ruled it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over the husband's appeal." Initially, the
court determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction of the hus-
band's appeal when he failed to appeal a final order or an appeal-
able interlocutory order." The court of appeals, however, ex-
plained that the determination of whether the court of appeals
even has subject-matter jurisdiction is itself a valid ruling by the
court." Notwithstanding that the court could not hear the merits
of his appeal, because it was a divorce case, Virginia Code section
20-99(5) allowed for attorney's fees.2 0
What happens in Paris, stays in Paris, according to the Virgin-
ia Court of Appeals. In a decision arising under Virginia's long-
arm statute,2 the court of appeals clarified that "'conceive or fa-
ther" means the actual act of conception.2 2 In Bergaust v. Flaher-
ty, after "one night in Paris," a mother from Virginia discovered
she was pregnant. 23 The father was an American filmmaker living
in France.2 4 Upon the mother's appeal of the circuit court's deci-
sion granting the father's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the court of appeals held that the baby was conceived
in Paris, and notwithstanding the fact that the father acknowl-
edged paternity, personal jurisdiction requires the conception to
actually occur in Virginia.25
A decision from the court of appeals in February of 2011 high-
lighted the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine" as well as provisions
of the UCCJEA." In Morrison v. Morrison, the court of appeals
17. 55 Va. App. 705, 707, 688 S.E.2d 908, 909 (2010).
18. Id. (citing Kotara v. Kotara, No. 0290-9-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 485, at *7 (Nov. 3,
2009) (unpublished decision)).
19. Id. at 710, 688 S.E.2d at 910.
20. Id. at 707, 710, 688 S.E.2d at 909-10; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-99(5) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(8) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
22. Bergaust v. Flaherty, 57 Va. App. 423, 435, 703 S.E.2d 248, 254 (2011).
23. Id. at 426, 703 S.E.2d at 249.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 427, 431, 435-36, 703 S.E.2d at 249-50, 252, 254.
26. See Morrison v. Morrison, 57 Va. App. 629, 632, 637, 642-43, 704 S.E.2d 617, 618,
620-21, 623 (2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-146.1 to -146.38 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum.
Supp. 2011); Sasson v. Shenhar, 276 Va. 611, 622, 667 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2008) (explaining
that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine excludes a party from seeking "relief from the
same judicial system whose authority he evades") (quoting Moscona v. Shenhar, 50 Va.
148 [Vol. 46:145
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held that in order for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to ap-
ply, a nexus must exist between the contemptuous behavior and
the relief sought in the court applying the doctrine. In Morrison,
the court failed to find such a nexus between a mother who vio-
lated a 2003 Michigan decree and her appeal of a Virginia trial
court's refusal to register that decree. "
The court agreed with the mother that the UCCJEA did not al-
low the circuit court, exercising jurisdiction, to refuse to register
the order on the grounds that the mother had violated it. 29 The
court cited Virginia Code section 20-146.24(A), which states that
a "court of this Commonwealth shall recognize and enforce a child
custody determination of a court of another state if the latter
court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this
act ... meeting the jurisdictional standards of this act and the
determination has not been modified in accordance with this
act."o
The 2003 decree, however, was subsequently modified by a
2008 Michigan modification order." Therefore, the circuit court
achieved the correct ruling, but for the wrong reasons, and the
court of appeals affirmed its decision."
The court of appeals reached an unusual custody decision re-
garding a surrogacy agreement in Prashad v. Copeland." In this
2009 decision, Copeland and Spivey were two male life partners
who entered into a surrogacy agreement with Prashad, a married
woman.3 4 The child was born in Minnesota, and the fathers,
Copeland and Spivey, moved with the child to North Carolina
with Prashad's consent.35
App. 238, 240, 253, 255, 649 S.E.2d 191, 192, 198-99 (2007)).
27. Morrison, 57 Va. App. at 637, 704 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Sasson, 276 Va. at 623, 667
S.E.2d at 561).
28. Id. at 638-41, 704 S.E.2d at 621-22.
29. Id. at 644-45, 704 S.E.2d at 624.
30. Id. at 642, 704 S.E.2d at 6 23 (emphasis added) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
146.24(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
31. Id. at 632-33, 704 S.E.2d at 618.
32. Id. at 644-45, 704 S.E.2d at 624.
33. 55 Va. App. 247, 252-54, 266, 685 S.E.2d 199, 201-03, 208 (2009).
34. Id. at 252, 685 S.E.2d at 201-02.
35. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 201.
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A year later, however, Prashad and her husband went to North
Carolina with the intent of recovering the child.16 During the cus-
tody proceedings in North Carolina, DNA tests established that
Spivey was the biological father." Copeland was named on the
birth certificate, and in 2006, both fathers were awarded primary
legal and physical custody by the North Carolina court."
Prashad filed a motion in Virginia seeking emergency physical
custody." The J&DR ruling was affirmed by the circuit court,
which registered the North Carolina custody order in its entire-
ty.40 The court of appeals found that because North Carolina court
exercised jurisdiction under UCCJEA, the trial court of Virginia
"was required to register the custody orders in their entirety or
not register them at all." Prashad failed to persuade the appel-
late court that Virginia should not recognize the North Carolina
custody order, because Virginia does not legally recognize same-
*42
sex marriages.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reached several other deci-
sions concerning the UCCJEA in 2011. In Harrison v. Harrison,
the mother returned from Belgium to Virginia to appear at the
emergency custody hearing initiated by the father, to retrieve her
children from the father in Virginia, and to return them to their
native country, Belgium.43 While still in Virginia, the mother was
served with the father's Virginia divorce pleadings.4 The court of
appeals found that the mother's presence in Virginia did not con-
fer personal jurisdiction upon her, citing the immunity from ser-
vice provision of Virginia Code section 20-146.8(A). 45 The court
further found that no long-arm jurisdiction existed pursuant to
36. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 202.
37. Id. at 253, 685 S.E.2d at 202.
38. Id. at 253-54, 685 S.E.2d at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 254, 685 S.E.2d at 202.
40. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 203.
41. Id. at 261, 685 S.E.2d at 206.
42. Id. at 263-65, 685 S.E.2d at 207-08.
43. 58 Va. App. 90, 95-96, 706 S.E.2d 905, 908 (2011).
44. Id. at 96, 706 S.E.2d at 908.
45. Id. at 100-01, 706 S.E.2d at 910-11 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-146.8(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2008)).
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Virginia Code section 8.01-328.1(A)(9), as Virginia was not the
mother's domicile.
In a unanimous decision, the court interpreted the UCCJEA
immunity provision to mean that when a party comes to Virginia
to enforce a custody order, the court obtains personal jurisdiction
neither upon that basis, nor upon the physical presence of the
parent, for purposes of adjudicating support and property rights
pursuant to the Virginia divorce action.47
In Prizzia v. Prizzia, another factually complicated decision in-
volving the UCCJEA, the mother refused to return from a
Christmas visit in Hungary with the parties' child after the fa-
ther returned to Virginia. 8 The mother sued the father for divorce
in Hungary and requested custody of their child.49 The father
promptly filed his own divorce and custody actions in Virginia."o
The court of appeals reasoned that Virginia was the home state
under the recent home state rule since the child lived in Virginia
for some time, even though it was less than six months." The
court determined that Virginia had jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA to make an initial custody determination.5 2 However,
the matter was reversed and remanded for the trial court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the initial custody determination and con-
sider the evidence and factors regarding whether Virginia was an
inconvenient forum.
In making this decision, the court of appeals reasoned that be-
cause the trial court had jurisdiction over child custody, it also
had jurisdiction to order child support. 5 Even though the parties
were divorced by the Hungarian court, the court of appeals rea-
soned that the Virginia trial court had equity jurisdiction when
46. Id. at 103-05, 706 S.E.2d at 912-13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(9)
(Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
47. Id. at 100, 706 S.E.2d at 910-11.
48. 58 Va. App. 137, 145, 707 S.E.2d 461, 465 (2011).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 148-50, 707 S.E.2d at 466-67 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-146.18 (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2010); id. § 20-146.12(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
52. Id. at 150, 707 S.E.2d at 467.
53. Id. at 155, 707 S.E.2d at 467-70 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-146.18 (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
54. Id. at 157, 707 S.E.2d at 470-71 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(3) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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the divorce action was filed in Virginia by the husband, even
though the trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
divorce in favor of Hungary." The court of appeals held that
"where a case is originally filed as a divorce proceeding and in-
cludes child custody and child support issues," the court may ex-
ercise "jurisdiction to award child support as an equitable con-
comitant to its jurisdiction over child custody."5 6
3. Miscellaneous
Bigamy is not often litigated in the court of appeals, but in
2009, the court illustrated that void marriages cannot be cured by
"corrective measures." 7 In Davidson v. Davidson, the husband
and the wife attempted to marry on August 31, 2006, before the
husband concluded his divorce from his former spouse." At the
wife's request, and without the presence of the husband, the offi-
ciate re-signed the new certificate, falsely stating that the cere-
mony occurred on September 14, 2006." The court upheld the
wife's subsequent petition for annulment.o
B. Legislative Changes
In the past several years, only one new bill was passed that re-
lated to this topic. Service of process on foreign service officers is
not an issue of general importance, but for practitioners in the
Tidewater and northern Virginia areas, this area of law is im-
portant. The bill amended two existing statutes: Virginia Code
section 20-97, discussing domicile and resident requirements for
divorce and annulment suits; and section 8.01-328.1, Virginia's
long-arm statute.
Now, the court may execute personal jurisdiction over a person
who has "executed an agreement in this Commonwealth which
55. Id. at 156-57, 707 S.E.2d at 470-71.
56. Id. at 157, 707 S.E.2d at 471.
57. Davidson v. Davidson, No. 2356-08-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 313, at *3-4 (July 14,
2009) (unpublished decision).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id. at *1-2.
60. Id. at *5-6.
61. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 582, 2009 Va. Acts 917 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1, 20-97 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
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obligates the person to pay spousal support or child support .. . to
a person who has satisfied the residency requirements in suits for
annulments or divorce for . .. foreign service officers of the United
States pursuant to § 20-97."62 Additionally, a foreign service of-
ficer is now considered a domiciliary for such suits if he or she:
"(i) at the time the suit is commenced is, or immediately preceding
such suit was, stationed in any territory or foreign country and
(ii) was domiciled in the Commonwealth for the six month period
immediately preceding his being stationed in such territory or
country."6 3 The legal import of this provision is that Virginia now
may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign service officers.
III. PREMARITAL AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS: CASE LAW
A. Validity
Mental status has obvious relevancy in a court's determination
of the validity of marriage contracts. In Bailey v. Bailey, the court
of appeals upheld the trial court's determination that a "Contract
of Marriage" was not a valid property settlement agreement
("PSA") where the husband, a schizoaffective psychotic, was on a
weekend furlough from a psychiatric ward when his wife present-
ed him a "Contract of Marriage."6 4 Not only did the husband be-
lieve he was "[s]igning a document to go home," but the contract
also assigned all debts to the husband and assets to the wife.
In Doering v. Doering, the court of appeals addressed the cir-
cumstances in which a trial court must incorporate a parties' PSA
into the final divorce decree." In Doering, the parties entered into
a PSA in which the husband agreed to pay the wife $4000 per
month in spousal support and $1200 per month in child support
for their one child. " The PSA allowed either party to pursue mod-
62. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)) (italics
in original).
63. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (Cum. Supp. 2009)) (italics in
original).
64. 54'Va. App. 209, 211-12, 677 S.E.2d 56, 58(2009).
65. Id. at 212-13, 677 S.E.2d at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. 54 Va. App. 162, 166, 676 S.E.2d 353, 355 (2009).
67. Id. at 167, 676 S.E.2d at 355.
1532011]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ification of the spousal or child support amount, which was "modi-
fiable upon a material change in circumstances."6 8
In August 2003, the wife filed for divorce and "requested that
the PSA be incorporated into the [final] divorce decree."69 The
husband responded "that the PSA was executed under duress,
fraud, and misrepresentation by [his] wife and that it was uncon-
scionable.""o The trial court stated that the PSA was a "lousy
agreement" for the husband but otherwise denied his request to
set it aside, holding the PSA valid and enforceable although
"there [had] been some considerable change in circumstances []
affecting the ability of [the husband] to pay.""
The trial court, however, refused to incorporate the PSA, stat-
ing that the wife would be before the court "on a weekly basis"
seeking court-ordered support given "there's no way under the
sun [the husband] can meet the [spousal and child support pay-
ment] obligations that [the PSA] imposes on him."72 The trial
court found a material change in circumstances from the time of
execution of the PSA in 2003 to the 2005 evidentiary hearing and
ordered the husband to pay $330 per month in spousal support
and $536 per month in child support."
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the
trial court has discretion under Virginia Code section 20-109.1,
which states that "[a]ny court may affirm, ratify and incorporate
by reference" the PSA into the final decree.7 4 The court of appeals
found no abuse of discretion by the lower court's refusal to incor-
porate the agreement. The court further held that the husband
proved the agreement allowed for a modification and that no au-
thority existed requiring the trial court to incorporate the PSA
before ruling on a party's request for modification of the PSA.16
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 167-68, 676 S.E.2d at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 168, 676 S.E.2d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 169, 676 S.E.2d at 356.
74. Id. at 169-70, 676 S.E.2d at 356 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2011); Forrest v. Forrest, 3 Va. App. 236, 239, 349 S.E.2d 157, 159 (1986)).
75. Id. 170, 676 S.E.2d at 357.
76. Id. at 172, 676 S.E.2d at 358.
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The most important recent opinion by the Court of Appeals of
Virginia regarding the validity of marital agreements was Sims v.
Sims, where the court of appeals reversed the trial court's failure
to set aside a PSA as unconscionable. Prior to Sims, Galloway v.
Galloway, required a two-prong showing for unconscionability."
Galloway demanded that the party seeking to set aside a marital
agreement must typically satisfy two prongs: "1) a gross disparity
existed in the division of assets and 2) overreaching or oppressive
influences.""
In Sims, the court lessened the burden of the second prong by
explaining that overreaching may be established in either of two
ways:
When the accompanying incidents are inequitable and show [(a)] bad
faith, such as concealments, misrepresentations, undue advantage,
[or] oppression on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or [(b)]
ignorance, weakness of mind, sickness, old age, incapacity, pecuniary
necessities, and the like, on the part of the other, these circumstanc-
es, combined with [evidence of the first prong,] inadequacy of price,
may easily induce a court to grant relief, defensive or affirmative.
In the case at hand, the second prong was proven where the
wife merely received an automobile and personal property in her
possession." The court held that this agreement left the wife a
ward of the state, penniless and due to her disability, unable to
obtain employment.8 2 Therefore, the wife, as a matter of law,
proved both the first prong of disparity and the second prong by
showing infirmity and pecuniary necessity." The agreement was
held to be unconscionable.84
Prenuptial agreements were also the subject of appellate scru-
tiny. The court of appeals in Chaplain v. Chaplain set aside a
77. 55 Va. App. 340, 354, 685 S.E.2d 869, 875-76 (2009).
78. 47 Va. App. 83, 92, 622 S.E.2d 267, 271 (2005) (citing Drewry v. Drewry, 8 Va.
App. 460, 472-73, 383 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1989)).
79. Id. (citing Shenk v. Shenk, 39 Va. App. 161, 179 n.13, 571 S.E.2d 896, 905 n.13
(2002)).
80. Sims, 55 Va. App. at 349-50, 685 S.E.2d at 873 (emphasis added) (quoting Derby
v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 28-29, 378 S.E.2d 74, 79 (1989) (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
81. Id. at 352-54, 685 S.E.2d at 875.
82. Id. at 352-53, 685 S.E.2d at 875.
83. Id. at 353-54, 685 S.E.2d at 875.
84. Id. at 354, 685 S.E.2d at 875.
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premarital agreement as unconscionable where the evidence
showed that the wife spoke Arabic, Spanish, French, and broken
English, often using a translator.8 ' The testimony of the husband
was that the wife could "read the English menu in a Chinese res-
taurant."" The testimony was that the wife "thought that she was
* * *,87
signing a paper for marriage.
Next, the court looked at the great disparity of value between
what the wife and the husband received per the agreement." The
wife would basically receive nothing more than $100,000 if she
and her husband remained married upon the husband's death."
The court further found that the husband failed to disclose all of
his assets, contrary to Virginia Code section 20-151(A)(2)." There-
fore, the trial court erred in sustaining the husband's motion to
strike, and the court reversed and remanded the case."
Also important in Chaplain was that the court was asked to de-
termine whether the trial court's interlocutory order was properly
appealable.92 The court, relying upon Pinkard v. Pinkard, found
that it had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the sole issue re-
maining was whether to enter a divorce decree based upon the
terms of the agreement.93 Therefore, this interlocutory appeal was
proper because this issue decided the case."
85. 54 Va. App. 762, 771, 776, 682 S.E.2d 108, 112, 115 (2009).
86. Id. at 771, 682 S.E.2d at 112.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 774, 682 S.E.2d at 114.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 776, 682 S.E.2d at 115 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
91. Id. at 777, 682 S.E.2d at 115.
92. Id. at 766, 682 S.E.2d at 110.
93. Id. at 767-70, 682 S.E.2d at 111-12.
For an interlocutory decree to adjudicate the principles of a cause, "the decree
must determine that the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties
are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only neces-
sary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascer-
tain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the
suit."
Id. (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1991) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94. Id. at 770-71, 682 S.E.2d at 112.
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B. Interpretation
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders ("QDROs") are trouble-
some for both practitioners and courts. Often, a gap in time exists
between the entry of a final divorce decree and the entry of the
QDRO that actually splits the related accounts. The court of ap-
peals dealt with the situation of what happens if one party takes
action during this time period that frustrates or effectively denies
the ability of the other party to obtain the relief ordered by the
QDRO in Lewis v. Lewis."
In Lewis, a PSA between the parties provided that the marital
share of the husband's profit-sharing plan and pension would be
divided 50/50 by a QDRO and that the wife would be awarded a
separate share of the pension paid to her for the duration of her
life based upon her actuarial life expectancy." When the parties
separated, the husband was fully vested in the pension plan."
Because the parties could not agree on the language of the
QDRO, the court entered a final decree without the QDRO." Prior
to the QDRO's entry, and unbeknownst to the wife, the husband
retired." In his retirement paperwork, he checked a box indicat-
ing that he wished to receive his pension "as a single life annui-
ty."1oo He did not, therefore, request any joint or survivor annuity
payments nor any payments whatsoever that would go to his
wife.' The husband further withdrew his entire profit-sharing
plan.10 The husband then began receiving his full pension until
Philip Morris decided to freeze his benefits pending the outcome
of this case.' 3 The wife did not receive any of her husband's pen-
sion or profit-sharing funds, either directly from the employer or
from her husband.104
95. 53 Va. App. 528, 673 S.E.2d 888 (2009).
96. Id. at 531-32, 673 S.E.2d at 889-90.
97. Id. at 532, 673 S.E.2d at 890.
98. Id. at 533, 673 S.E.2d at 890.
99. Id.
100. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 534, 673 S.E.2d at 891.
103. Id. at 533, 673 S.E.2d at 890.
104. Id.
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The trial court's February 27, 2008 opinion found "that the ac-
crued unreduced benefit value of the pension plan as of June 1,
2003 was $3,719.82."o' The trial court then awarded the wife
$1,246.14 per month from the husband's pension and ordered the
husband to obtain a $200,000 life insurance policy as a pension
payment for her lifetime, in replacement of the wife's entitlement
under the PSA."'0 The trial court further awarded the "wife her
initial share of the profit-sharing account, as well as interest on
those funds from the time of separation."o7
Regarding the profit-sharing account, the husband argued that
the trial court erred in granting the wife any portion of the
growth that occurred after June 1, 2003, the date of separation.'
The husband stated that the PSA precludes such an award of in-
terest after that date.o' "Under the parties' PSA, [the] wife was
entitled to [one-half] of the marital share of [the] [h]usband's
Philip Morris profit sharing account minus certain offsets."110 The
court of appeals ruled that "the interest that accrued on wife's
portion of the marital share belonged to wife, just as the interest
that accrued on husband's portion of the marital share belonged
to husband.""' Further, the court looked disfavorably on the hus-
band's actions that removed the funds from the wife's control and
affirmed the trial court's ruling.112
Regarding the life insurance, the court of appeals held that alt-
hough Virginia Code section 20-107.3(K) allows a court to enter
"additional orders" to effectuate a parties' agreement, such as
remedy conflicts, Virginia Code section 20-107.3(G)(2) specifically
and clearly prohibits a trial court from ordering a husband to ob-
tain life insurance for the benefit of his wife."8
The court of appeals considered the interplay of spousal sup-
port, the obligation to pay the mortgage on the formal marital
105. Id. at 535, 673 S.E.2d at 891 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 535-36, 673 S.E.2d at 891.
107. Id. at 536, 673 S.E.2d at 891-92.
108. Id. at 538-39, 673 S.E.2d at 893.
109. Id. at 539, 673 S.E.2d at 893.
110. Id. at 538-39, 673 S.E.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 540, 673 S.E.2d at 894.
112. Id. at 541, 673 S.E.2d at 894.
113. Id. at 543, 673 S.E.2d at 895 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G)(2), (K) (Repl.
Vol. 2008)).
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residence, and bankruptcy in Stacy v. Stacy.1 14 Although both par-
ties expressly waived spousal support in the PSA, a clause in the
PSA characterized the husband's liability for the mortgage to be
"in the nature of support.""' Due to the wife's admitted post-
decree cohabitation, the husband moved to terminate his respon-
sibility to pay the mortgage, arguing it was really spousal sup-
port."' The wife argued that the mortgage payments were in the
nature of equitable distribution and not support and, therefore,
not dischargeable by the husband."'
The court reasoned that the provisions of a PSA are to be read
as a whole and in context with each other."' The language tend-
ing to show these payments as support was merely to protect the
wife against any future bankruptcy proceeding of the husband."'
The court held that the "prohibition was made possible because,
under bankruptcy law, an obligation found to be in the nature of
support is a non-dischargeable debt."'20 Therefore, the court held
that the intent of the parties was merely to protect the wife
against the husband's possible future bankruptcy and not to
characterize these mortgage payments as spousal support, as con-
templated by Virginia Code section 20-109.121
IV. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
A. Case Law
1. Classification
In the 2008 case of Chretien v. Chretien, the court of appeals
was asked by the husband to review the trial court's decision
classifying the wife's personal injury award for her injuries sus-
tained during a motorcycle accident as the wife's separate proper-
114. 53 Va. App. 38, 41-43, 669 S.E.2d 348, 349-50 (2008) (en banc).
115. Id. at 47, 669 S.E.2d at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 42, 669 S.E.2d at 349-50.
117. Id., 669 S.E.2d at 350.
118. Id. at 48, 669 S.E.2d at 353 (citing Quadros & Assocs., P.C. v. City of Hampton,
268 Va. 50, 54-55, 547 S.E.2d 90, 93 (2004) (citations omitted)).
119. Id.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2010).
121. Id. at 48-49, 669 S.E.2d at 353; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2011).
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ty.12 Due to the husband's negligence, the wife was injured on a
motorcycle and received approximately $150,000.123 The burden of
proof provided the fundamental issue.12 4
Virginia Code section 20-107.3(H) defines "marital share" as
"that part of the total personal injury or workers' compensation
recovery attributable to lost wages or medical expenses."' The
husband argued that proceeds are subject to the presumption
that all property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be
marital property.26
The trial court held that the personal injury recovery is pre-
sumptively separate property. 12 7 The trial court found that the
"husband failed to overcome that presumption or to show that he
substantially increased the value of the recovery through his per-
sonal efforts." 128 Further, "the court found that, even if the per-
sonal injury recovery is presumed to be marital property, [the]
wife overcame that presumption and proved that the proceeds are
separate."12 The trial court also issued an alternative holding,
stating that in light of the factors of Virginia Code section 20-
107.3(E), the court awards all the proceeds to the wife because of
the husband's negligence and found that it would not be equitable
to award any of the proceeds to the husband as he "caused the
tort that led to the serious injuries suffered by [the wife].""'
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the husband that
the circuit court erred in its classification.131 Relying upon the
language of Virginia Code section 20-107.3(H), the court held that
the personal injury award is presumptively marital, and thus, the
122. 53 Va. App. 200, 202-04, 670 S.E.2d 45, 46-47 (2008).
123. See id. at 205, 670 S.E.2d at 48 (citing Von Raab v. Von Raab, 26 Va. App. 239,
248, 494 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1997)).
124. Id. at 202-03, 670 S.E.2d at 46-47.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (emphasis add-
ed).
126. Chretien, 53 Va. App. at 203, 670 S.E.2d at 47 (citing Von Raab, 26 Va. App. at
248, 494 S.E.2d at 160)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 203-04, 670 S.E.2d at 47.
130. Id. at 204, 670 S.E.2d at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
131. Id.
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"wife bore the burden of proving that some or all of the personal
injury recovery was separate property."32
Although the court of appeals agreed that the trial court erred
in its classification, the court found that the error was harm-
less.33 Relying upon the fact that the trial court stated that it
would have awarded the entire amount of the award to the wife
in any event, pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-107.3(E), the
court held that so long as that basis was proper, the error was
harmless because the trial court would have reached the same re-
sult even if it had classified the award correctly.'34
An argument dealt with by all equitable distribution practi-
tioners and courts is whether to apply the Brandenburg' or the
Keeling"' formulas. The court of appeals took a "split the baby"
approach in Rinaldi v. Rinaldi.'7 In Rinaldi, the court weighed in
on the propriety of the circuit court applying the Brandenburg
formula to one piece of real property and the Keeling formula to a
different piece of property.' Virginia Code section 20-107.3(E)
demands that the trial court achieve an equitable result, but as
long as the trial court considers the required factors, the court is
free to choose which method is appropriate for the particular as-
set provided that the result is not patently inequitable."
Practitioners should take notice that classification of assets oc-
curs at the time of acquisition, notwithstanding the possibility of
subsequent transmutation. In Duva v. Duva, the husband pur-
132. Id. at 205, 670 S.E.2d at 48 (citing Von Raab, 26 Va. App. at 246, 494 S.E.2d at
160); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
133. Id. at 208, 670 S.E.2d at 49.
134. Id. at 207, 670 S.E.2d at 49 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
135. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). In Bran-
denburg, the Kentucky Court of Appeals approved a formula that apportioned the marital
and non-marital components of hybrid property in "the same percentages as their respec-
tive contributions to the total equity in the property." Id. (quoting Newman v. Newman,
597 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. Keeling v. Keeling, 47 Va. App. 484, 490-94, 624 S.E.2d 687, 689-91 (2006). The
Keeling formula is more equitable when the parties use marital funds to hold a property or
pay down a marital debt, notwithstanding separate contributions to the down payment.
Id. at 493-94, 624 S.E.2d at 691 (citing von Raab, 26 Va. App. at 249, 494 S.E.2d at 161).
137. 53 Va. App. 61, 70, 679 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2008).
138. Id. at 72, 699 S.E.2d at 364.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011); Rinaldi, 53 Va.
App. at 70-72, 679 S.E.2d at 364.
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chased a property five months prior to marriage and then the
parties used almost exclusively marital funds to continue to pay
for and manage the property.140 The trial court erroneously ex-
plained in an opinion letter that "[t]he simple fact the property
was acquired before marriage does not overcome the [c]ourt's
finding that the bulk of the mortgage was paid with marital
funds. Separate property may become marital property by the act
of comingling which is what was found to occur in this case."141
The court of appeals found error with the trial court in that
"the trial court did not consider marital funds losing its classifica-
tion as marital property when comingled with the receiving prop-
erty."142 The court found error in that the trial court should have
classified the property as separate initially, where the husband
acquired it before the marriage.143 The burden would then shift to
the wife to show transmutation.4 4
2. Valuation
Retirement funds are to be valued at the time of the eviden-
tiary hearing. In Cusack v. Cusack, the court of appeals found er-
ror with the trial court in allowing the wife to receive 50% of the
marital share of the husband's military retirement benefits com-
mencing on the date of his retirement.145 The court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's ruling, finding that "[g]eneral principles
for the valuation and division of property in equitable distribution
proceedings also apply to the valuation and division of retirement
benefits, including the principle that '[t]he court shall determine
the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary
hearing on the valuation issue.""4 6
140. 55 Va. App. 286, 292, 685 S.E.2d 842, 845 (2009).
141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing VA. CODE ANN. §20-107.3(A)(3)(d)
(Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
142. Id. at 294, 685 S.E.2d at 846.
143. See id. at 299, 685 S.E.2d at 849.
144. Id. at 294, 685 S.E.2d at 846.
145. 53 Va. App. 315, 318-19, 323, 671 S.E.2d 420, 422, 424 (2009).
146. Id. at 320, 671 S.E.2d at 423 (emphasis in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.3 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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B. Legislative Changes
The only important revision to our statute came as a result of
Gilliam v. McGrady.14 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted
the language of Virginia Code section 20-107.3(A) strictly con-
cerning the classification of debts.'4 8 Prior practice across the
commonwealth in all courts was that if a debt was incurred dur-
ing the marriage, it was presumed to be marital property, even if
incurred in the name of one party.'49
This prior presumption made the life of practitioners and trial
judges much easier in all respects, including during settlement
and trial. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined the
statute and could find no such presumption as opposed to the
property provisions of this same statute."o Consequently, the
court held that debts in the name of one spouse were presumed to
be separate, and joint debts were presumed to be marital."'
After this decision, settling and trying cases immediately be-
came more difficult, time-consuming, and costly, and everyone
yearned for the good old days. The Virginia Coalition on Family
Law Legislation took up the challenge and appointed a sub-
committee to remedy this problem by drafting corrective legisla-
tion.'5 2 The new bill was drafted and found little opposition in the
GA. "' The new statute, which took effect July 1, 2011, essentially
returned to the traditional way that practitioners and trial courts
dealt with debt."4
Simply stated, a debt is now classified as separate or marital in
Virginia Code sections 20-107.3(A)(4) and (5)."' Separate debts
are: (i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) incurred after the last
date of separation; or (iii) any debt classified as part separate as
147. 279 Va. 703, 691 S.E. 2d 797 (2010).
148. Id. at 708-10, 691 S.E.2d at 799-800 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
149. See id.
150. Id. at 708-09, 691 S.E.2d at 799-800.
151. Id. at 710, 691 S.E.2d at 800.
152. See Alan Cooper, Family Law Group's Bills Are Advancing, VA. LAW. WKLY., Feb.
21, 2011, at 3.
153. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2011), available at
http://1is.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?l 1 1+sum+hbl569.
154. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 655, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
155. Id.
1632011]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
per (A)(5).156 However, if a party can demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it was for a "marital purpose," the court
may classify the debt as marital.5 1 It will be interesting to see
how this discretionary issue is interpreted in practice.
As for marital debt, it is now defined as debt incurred in joint
names during the marriage or debt incurred in either spouses
name during the marriage; however, to the extent a party can
show that a debt was incurred, or the proceeds were secured by
incurring the debt were used, in whole or in part, for a non-
marital purpose, the court may designate it as separate or hy-
brid."' This discretion is once again provided to the court.15' Final-
ly, as with property, the court can only apportion jointly owed
marital debt to a party.60
The most intriguing aspect of this new statute is whether the
courts will apply it to cases filed before July 1, 2011. The general-
ly accepted, but unpopular view, is that it will be applied only
prospectively. All practitioners are encouraged to set forth to trial
courts the most persuasive arguments and theories for its appli-
cation retroactively.
V. CHILD SUPPORT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Most legislative child support amendments involve procedural
or remedial issues. Few relate to the actual amount of support
awarded by a court or calculated by practitioners. For examples
of such technical changes, the GA recently enacted two amend-
ments. First, Virginia Code section 20-60.3 was amended to add
new "notice" provisions to add to the already burdensome list.' It
is now wise to either develop a computerized form or to review
the statute when preparing any order or decree where support is
included. Second, the general garnishment statute'6 2 was amend-
ed to favor child support obligations over other creditors."' A par-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 706, 2009 Va. Acts 1500, 1500-01 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-60.3 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
163. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 332, 2009 Va. Acts 552, 553-54 (codified as amended at
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ent who supports a dependent child who lives with them may ex-
empt an additional $34, $52, and $66 per week for one, two, or
three or more children, respectively.164 This exemption does not
apply to a household whose gross income (including support) ex-
ceeds $1750 per month. 6
Of a more substantive nature, the GA recently enacted three
new statutes. Health insurance and medical costs remain a criti-
cal and often confusing issue. In 2009, the GA revised Virginia
Code sections 20-60.3 and 63.2-1900, establishing a new term
"cash medical support", i.e., cash payments for medical expens-
es. This term merely means the proportional payment by the
parties for unreimbursed medical expenses pursuant to Virginia
Code section 20-108.2.117 These terms must be included in all or-
ders of support.1 8 In 2010, however, the definition of "cash medi-
cal support" was amended to rescind the right of the Virginia De-
partment of Social Services to order a 2.5% cash medical support
payment from noncustodial parents if the child received Medicaid
or Family Access to Medical Insurance Security Plan."
Finally, the criminal non-support statute, Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-61, was addressed in the 2010 session. This statute was
frequently used, until thirty years ago when it was basically ig-
nored by family lawyers and the staff of the juvenile court sys-
tem. Because of the criminal burden of proof problems, it was al-
most abandoned by most courts and litigants. The 2010
amendment provided that a person is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for desertion and non-support of a spouse or a child who are
not receiving federal or state aid to a permanently and totally
disabled person.' It is still rarely used because of the burden of
proof problems.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (Cum. Supp. 2009); codified at id. § 34-4.2 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
164. Ch. 332, 2009 Va. Acts at 554.
165. Id.
166. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 713, 2009 Va. Acts 1508, 1511, 1519 (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-60.3, 63.2-1900 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
167. Ch. 713, 2009 Va. Acts at 1519.
168. Id. at 1511.
169. Act of Apr. 7, 2010, ch. 243, 2010 Va. Acts 335, 341 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1900 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
170. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 619, 2010 Va. Acts 1108, 1108-09 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
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VI. SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE
A. Case Law
1. Determination
A decision from the court of appeals rendered in 2009 actually
assists practitioners in determining the weight that the standard
of living factor should be given in a spousal support determina-
tion."' In Robinson v. Robinson, the wife was awarded $5,000 per
month in spousal support.17 2 The husband originally appealed this
decision, claiming that the trial court had failed to make written
findings regarding the statutory factors found in Virginia Code
section 20-107.1(E)."' In the first appeal, the court of appeals
agreed with the husband and reversed and remanded the award
to the trial court.'74 Upon remand, the trial court added an "Ad-
dendum to Final Decree" in which the details regarding the fac-
tors were documented.7 The award of spousal support remained
the same.16
Once again, the husband appealed the trial court's decision,
claiming that the spousal support award surpassed the wife's
proven needs, and exceeded the standard of living the parties
maintained while married to one another.'77 The husband did not
contest the total sum of the wife's monthly need but argued that
she could subsidize her need with income from her assets.'
On the second appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the hus-
band incorrectly assumed that spousal support is aimed at keep-
ing a wife at the same standard of living that was enjoyed during
the marriage."'7 The court of appeals stated that the standard of
living is not meant to "cap or limit" the amount that can be
awarded.' The trial court must consider all of the statutory fac-
171. Robinson v. Robinson, 54 Va. App. 87, 95-97, 675 S.E.2d 873, 877-78 (2009).
172. Id. at 92, 675 S.E.2d at 876.
173. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 95, 675 S.E.2d at 877.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 95-96, 675 S.E.2d at 877.
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tors, not just the single issue of the standard of living."' The oth-
er factors the trial court considered in the Robinson decision in-
cluded the fact that the marriage was thirty-seven years long, the
fact that the wife had made significant non-monetary contribu-
tions, and the fact that the wife had been out of the workforce for
thirty-four years and was, at that time, fifty-nine years old.
2. Modification
In Brown v. Brown, the court of appeals addressed when a
spousal support order may be modified.183 In Brown, the husband
appealed the trial court's dismissal of his petition to terminate
spousal support based upon a material change in circumstanc-
es.' After entry of the divorce decree awarding the wife spousal
support, the husband sought to retire from his job and filed a mo-
tion to terminate his obligation due to that material change in
circumstances. 85
The circuit court granted the wife's motion and dismissed the
husband's petition, finding that the parties' consent decree had a
binding legal effect on them and could not be modified at the uni-
lateral request of the husband."' The wife previously filed a show
cause motion alleging an arrearage in spousal support, which the
consent decree subsequently resolved.'
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether the
consent decree, which resolved the show cause issue, constituted
an agreement to modify spousal support and thus made it subject
to the limitations of Virginia Code section 20-109(C) as ruled in
Newman v. Newman."' The court of appeals distinguished the
ruling in Newman, which involved a consent order that was cre-
ated in the context of a motion to modify spousal support, not in
181. See id. at 96, 675 S.E.2d at 877; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E)(2), (13) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
182. Robinson, 54 Va. App. at 96-97, 675 S.E.2d at 878.
183. 53 Va. App. 723, 724-25, 674 S.E.2d 597, 598 (2009).
184. Id. at 726, 674 S.E.2d at 598.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 725-26, 674 S.E.2d at 598.
188. Id. at 727-28, 674 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Newman v. Newman, 42 Va. App. 557,
568-69, 593 S.E.2d 533, 539 (2004) (en banc)); see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(C) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
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the context of a show cause petition.18 The court of appeals rea-
soned that in Newman the order concerned the amount of spousal
support payable to the wife by the husband, not the manner in
which the husband would pay back a spousal support arrear-
age.' The court of appeals held that the contempt order before it
did not state that it resolved all issues between the parties and
was not endorsed in such a fashion as to indicate an overall reso-
lution, but rather was endorsed as seen and agreed upon.'
Therefore, the language of the consent order at issue in Brown
concerned only the resolution of the show cause petition, and the
husband could petition for a termination of support based upon
the divorce decree. 192
Another case regarding the termination of spousal support is
Stroud v. Stroud (Stroud 11), where the court refused to equate a
lesbian relationship to a marriage."' Stroud involved two appeals,
and an unusual set of circumstances. In the original appeal,
known as Stroud I, the husband argued that his wife's spousal
support should be terminated, because she was cohabiting in a re-
lationship analogous to marriage, but the relationship was with
another woman.194 The trial court ruled as a matter of law that
same-sex persons in Virginia cannot cohabit in a relationship
analogous to marriage and found that the husband had failed to
meet his burden of proof of cohabitation."' The decision of the tri-
al court was reversed, and the matter remanded."
In the subsequent appeal in Stroud II, the husband once again
was requesting an award of attorney's fees, arguing that since the
appellate court in essence had ruled in his favor, the wife should
be obligated to pay his attorney's fees and costs."' The court of
appeals, however, reasoned that the termination event in the par-
ties' separation agreement was not self-executing but required a
189. Compare Brown, 53 Va. App. at 729, 674 S.E.2d at 600 (involving an order created
in the context of a show cause petition), with Newman, 42 Va. App. at 560, 593 S.E.2d at
535 (involving an order created in the context of a motion to modify spousal support).
190. Brown, 53 Va. App. at 729-30, 674 S.E.2d at 600.
191. Id. at 730, 674 S.E.2d at 600.
192. Id. at 731, 674 S.E.2d at 601.
193. 54 Va. App. 231, 233-34, 239, 675 S.E.2d 627, 630, 633 (2009).
194. 49 Va. App. 359, 365-66, 641 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2007).
195. Id. at 375, 377, 641 S.E.2d at 150.
196. Id. at 379, 377, 641 S.E.2d at 151.
197. Stroud II, 54 Va. App. at 232-33, 677 S.E.2d at 629-30.
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determination and proceeding before the trial court could deter-
mine if the husband met the burden of proof.' Since that issue
first had to be decided by the trial court and was not a self-
executing provision, i.e., termination of spousal support at a cer-
tain age or date, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to deny an award of attorney's fees to the husband under
the facts of that case.199
B. Legislative Changes
Recent legislation in this area of family law tackled only two
issues: (1) pendente lite payments for certain debts in circuit
courts, and (2) vocational evaluations in both circuit and J&DR
courts. Although spousal support is frequently addressed by the
court of appeals, the GA infrequently delved into this area, since
the revision relative to rehabilitative spousal support occurred
200
over ten years ago.
For the first time, the 2010 amendment to Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-108.1(H) statutorily permitted parties in both the circuit
and J&DR courts to enter an order, upon showing good cause, to
submit to a vocational evaluation by a vocational expert employed
by the moving party.201 This new statute also permits the expert
to attend depositions.2 02 Under the amendment, the order may
contain: the name and address of the expert; the scope of the
evaluation; and the time for filing the report with the court, and
copies to the parties.
The court also has the authority to award costs and fees for the
evaluation and the services of the expert.204 Prior to this provision,
the practice was inconsistent across the state as to whether the
court had the jurisdiction to order such an evaluation. Most prac-
titioners voluntarily agree to this type of evaluation, except for
198. Id. at 238-39, 677 S.E.2d at 632.
199. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 632-33.
200. See Melissa J. Roberts, Domestic Relations, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 948 (1999)
(citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
201. Act of Mar. 29, 2010, ch. 176, 2010 Va. Acts 237, 239 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(H) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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the more contentious areas of practice or more contentious indi-
vidual practitioners. With this amendment, the debate is now be-
hind us.
A dispute existed across the state as to whether circuit courts,
pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-103, had the authority to
order the payment of specific debts. The dispute generally in-
volved the payment of the mortgage on the marital residence. In
2011, the GA settled this dispute when it modified Virginia Code
section 20-103(A)(i)(b) to authorize a court to order "that a party
pay secured or unsecured debts incurred jointly or by either par-
ty."205 Many courts were already exercising this jurisdiction, but
others felt a statutory mandate was needed. Now, this issue is re-
solved.
VII. CUSTODY
A. Case Law
1. Modification of Visitation
In Duva v. Duva, the court of appeals held that a change in cir-
cumstances must be significant in order to alter visitation. 206 The
trial court awarded primary physical custody to the mother with
supervised visits to the father with the parties' children.2 07 The
agreement of the parties was reached in front of the trial court
but never incorporated into the form of an order.20 8 Subsequent to
this ruling in 2006, in 2008, the father petitioned the court for a
modification of visitation. 209 The father argued that since the
mother had failed, pursuant to their earlier agreement, to take
the children to their therapy sessions, a change in visitation was
warranted.2 10 The court of appeals, however, disagreed."
205. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 687, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-103(A)(i)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
206. See 55 Va. App. 286, 291, 303, 685 S.E.2d 842, 845, 851 (2009).
207. Id. at 289, 685 S.E.2d at 844.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 290, 685 S.E.2d at 844.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 291, 685 S.E.2d at 845.
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The court of appeals found that the father failed to make the
necessary connection between the children's missed therapy ses-
sions and the necessity of a change in the visitation schedule,
much less demonstrated that the missed therapy constituted a
material change in circumstance.2 1 2 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision to not modify the visitation under the
facts of the case.213
2. Third-Party Visitation
In Florio v. Clark, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
three issues: (1) the appropriate standard to use in a third-party
case where the unfitness of a parent is at issue; (2) the effect of a
guardian ad litem's recommendations; and (3) the importance of
the child's preference.21 4 In Florio, a biological father's unsuccess-
ful attempts to win custody of his son encompassed essentially a
five-year period of litigation.2 15
The child, at age five, lived with his maternal aunt and uncle,
upon the death of the biological mother.216 Thereafter, the father
repeatedly attempted to gain custody of his son and was awarded
temporary custody for five months pending the next hearing date
in front of the juvenile court.217 The juvenile court ultimately
awarded custody to the aunt and uncle.2 18
This case went to the Supreme Court of Virginia which empha-
sized that the best interests of the child must be considered, and
the presumption of custody being awarded to a natural parent
may be rebutted by establishing certain factors by clear and con-
vincing evidence: parental unfitness; a previous order of divesti-
ture; voluntary relinquishment; abandonment; and special facts
and circumstances constituting an extraordinary reason to take
the child from his biological parent.21 The court held that once
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 277 Va. 566, 571-72, 674 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2009).
215. Id. at 569-70, 674 S.E.2d at 846.
216. Id. at 569, 674 S.E.2d at 846.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 571, 674 S.E.2d at 847 (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 100, 340 S.E.2d
824, 827 (1986) (citations omitted)).
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the presumption is successfully rebutted, the natural parent then
must show that awarding him/her custody of his/her child would
be in the child's best interests.22 0
The child had only lived with his father for five months
throughout his entire life. 2 21 The father had little to do with the
child in his first five years of life and never paid child support.22 2
In addition, the father had a long misdemeanor record including
multiple convictions for being drunk in public and DUIs. 2 3 The
child was one with special needs.2 24
The aunt and uncle, however, were a part of the child's life
since he was six months old and were well-suited to care for their
nephew, since both were college-educated, both served in the
United States Air Force, and both were able to provide the child
with health insurance.2 25
The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, ruling
that continuing to award custody to the aunt and uncle would
serve the best interests of the child.226 This affirmation of the de-
cision of the lower court occurred despite the fact that the child,
who was then ten years old, expressed his desire to live with his
father, and the guardian ad litem found that the father reformed
himself and was no longer unfit.
3. Relocation/Notice
Relocation is always a hot and difficult topic. In Judd v. Judd,
the mother sought to relocate to Wisconsin with the parties' two
young children over the father's objection.2 28 The mother failed to
give advance written notice of the specific street address where
she planned to relocate, as the existing pendente lite order re-
quired. 229 However, she filed a complaint asserting that she would
220. Id.
221. Id. at 569, 674 S.E.2d at 846.
222. Id. at 571, 674 S.E.2d at 847.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 572, 674 S.E.2d at 847.
225. Id. at 569, 572, 674 S.E.2d at 846-48.
226. Id. at 573, 674 S.E.2d at 848.
227. Id. at 572, 674 S.E.2d at 848.
228. 53 Va. App. 578, 581-82, 673 S.E.2d 913, 914 (2009).
229. Id. at 585, 673 S.E.2d at 916.
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be moving to Wisconsin. 3 0 The father objected on the ground that
the mother did not give him adequate notice of her intention to
relocate to Wisconsin, violating the thirty day notice requirement
of the pendente lite order.23 1
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the
father was provided adequate notice of the mother's intention to
relocate.' The court of appeals also found that a violation of Vir-
ginia Code section 20-124.5, which requires notice, does not pre-
vent the parties from litigating relocation.233 The mother met her
burden of proof that the relocation would not impair the chil-
dren's relationship with their father. 23 4 It was only in the very re-
cent history that the father became more involved in the chil-
dren's care and education.2 35
B. Legislative Changes
The most significant statutory amendments in the last several
years relate to deployed military personnel's visitation rights.2 36
The intent of the amendment seems to be to assure the family of
these deployed military personnel with continued access to the
their children.' Even though this amendment extends visitation
rights to family members of deployed personnel, the statute also
included appropriate safeguards.2 " Therefore, the GA recognized
opportunities for mischief and harm to the children. These safe-
guards include the following: (1) the court must find that it is in
the child's best interest before delegation of such visitation rights;
(2) the delegation or the deploying member's visitation can be in
whole or in part; (3) the child must have close and substantial re-
lationship with the family member; (4) the order delegating visit-
ation rights to the family member does not create a separate right
230. Id. at 586, 673 S.E.2d at 916.
231. Id. at 583, 673 S.E.2d at 915.
232. Id. at 585-86, 673 S.E.2d at 916.
233. Id. at 586, 673 S.E.2d at 916-17 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.5 (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2011)).
234. Id. at 589-90, 673 S.E.2d at 918.
235. Id. at 590, 673 S.E.2d at 918.
236. See Act of Mar. 22, 2011, ch. 351, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.8 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
237. See id.
238. See id.
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to visitation in such family member; (5) the deploying parent or
the non-deploying parent upon a showing of a change of circum-
stances may file a motion to rescind the order; (6) the order ter-
minates automatically upon the return of the deploying parent;
and (7) finally, the court may conduct a telephonic or electronic
order and video hearing." If utilized appropriately, this new
statute should be beneficial to a child's long-term relationship
with extended family members.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although not many, these past few years have provided some
very significant developments in Virginia family law. Practition-
ers should take special note of case law interpreting the UCCJEA
as well as the developments in the law relating to marital agree-
ments. For those practitioners whose practice significantly in-
volves military families, the advancements in the Virginia Mili-
tary Parents Equal Protection Act warrant attention. Finally, the
changes to the law relating to support and equitable distribution
are the most important to those practicing in the divorce and
support areas.
239. Ch. 351, 2011 Va. Acts -(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-124.8 to -
124.9 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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